NATO commander urges public attribution of Russian sabotage
Grynkewich calls for evidence-backed exposure as the alliance strengthens civilian infrastructure planning.
NATO’s senior military commander in Europe urged countries to identify Russia publicly when evidence linked it to sabotage and other destabilizing activity, Reuters reported on September 28.
General Alexus Grynkewich told European lawmakers that attribution could disrupt networks and impose political costs. He said the aim of Russian activity was to weaken the willingness of Ukraine’s partners to continue supporting Kyiv.
Grynkewich also credited NATO’s Eastern Sentry operation with making Russian forces more cautious about drone crossings into allied territory. Those assessments were his account of the operation’s effect, rather than an independently measured result presented in the report.
His proposed response combined exposure of hostile activity with continued backing for Ukraine. It placed resilience and clear public evidence alongside military measures in the alliance’s response to hybrid threats.
Eastern Sentry predates this latest warning. NATO announced it on September 12, 2025, after Russian drones violated Polish airspace two days earlier. The alliance said it would combine conventional assets with new technologies addressing drones, while allowing a more flexible military posture along its eastern flank.
Poland had requested consultations under Article 4, which provides for allies to discuss threats to their security. NATO’s launch statement also described forward land forces in eight countries and work to protect Baltic undersea infrastructure.
That history puts Grynkewich’s message in context: exposing alleged sabotage complements a defensive deployment already under way. Attribution still requires evidence in each case; the general’s warning is not proof that every unexplained incident has the same perpetrator.
The civilian side of that response was detailed in NATO guidance issued in July. It noted that private companies operate much of the infrastructure supporting transport, communications, energy, food, water and medicine. Protecting those services requires coordination beyond military headquarters.
The guidance encouraged governments to identify essential suppliers, agree responsibilities with businesses and share information about threats and disruptions. It also recommended joint exercises and planning for continuity of services. NATO explicitly described the document as practical guidance rather than new legal obligations imposed on member states.
That distinction matters for how a warning from a commander becomes action. A public accusation can expose an alleged operation, but keeping a damaged service functioning depends on operators, repair capacity and decisions by national authorities. The July framework addresses those responsibilities alongside deterrence.
NATO's position is that civilian resilience supports military readiness as well as ordinary life. Grynkewich's demand for attribution adds the political element: identifying an adversary when the evidence warrants it. Neither approach removes the need to investigate the cause of a specific incident before assigning responsibility.
